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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND CASE HISTORY 
This is an appeal by Intervenor from an order and judgment of the 
Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, dismissing the complaint in intervention. 
After the Ccatplaint and Answer had been filed, Intervenor filed a motion 
for summary judgment against Defendant. Defendant filed her cross motion 
for summary judgment. Intervener's motion was denied. Defendant's motion 
was granted. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Mthough Intervenor attempts to raise other issues, the only real 
issue for review is whether or not Title 78-12-40, U.C.A., 1953, as 
amended, applies to the facts of this case and tolls the running of the 
statute of limitations. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Title 78-12-40, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, provides: 
Effect of failure of action not on merits. 
If any action is commenced within due time and a 
judgment thereon for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the 
plaintiff fails in such action or upon a cause of action 
otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited either 
by law or contract for commencing the same shall have 
expired, the plaintiff, or if he dies and the cause of action 
survives, his representatives, may commence a new action 
within one year after the reversal or failure. 
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jgTATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of Case. The Intervener, as personal representative of 
the estate of Etta Wood, claims in his Complaint in Intervention (R. 589-
593) that plaintiff Milton J. Hiltsley, deceased brother of Etta Wood, 
received money from her, that he held those monies as her "trustee" and 
that he breach his "confidential relationship" with her when he deposited 
those monies in savings accounts and certificates of deposit in the joint 
names of Milton J. Hiltsley and Hallalene M. Ryder, the defendant. 
(Paragraph 4 and 8 of Complaint, R. 590, 592) 
The claim which Intervener asserts against Defendant is that 
Defendant holds the monies represented by the savings account and 
certificates of deposit as a "trustee" for the Etta Wood's estate. 
(Paragraph (3) of prayer for relief in Conplaint, R.593) 
B. Course of Proceedings. After trial of the issues between 
Plaintiff and Defendant, the trial court, Honorable Bryant H. Croft, 
entered judgment in favor of the estate of Etta Wood, and in favor of 
Plaintiff Ruth S. Hiltsley personally. (R. 97-99) On Defendant's appeal of 
that judgment, case No. 19145, this Court rendered its decision reversing 
and remanding the case back to the Third District Court "for joinder of 
Etta Wood's Estate." (R 583-585) Etta Wood's personal representative, 
Intervenor herein, filed a Corrplaint in Intervention against the estate of 
Milton J. Hiltsley, plaintiff, and against Defendant. (R 589-593) 
Defendant filed her Answer. (R 594-596) Four days after Defendant's 
Answer was filed, Intervenor filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 601-
603) Defendant then filed her Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 614-
2 
615) 
C. Disposition in Court Below. Intervener's motion for summary 
judgment was denied. Defendant's cross motion for summary judgment was 
granted, and the Ccatplaint in Intervention was dismissed with prejudice. 
(R. 620-621) 
D. Statement of Facts. Because this appeal involves the application 
of the statute of limitations, the following facts relevant to the issue to 
be decided on appeal are presented in chronological order. 
1. Etta Wood, whose estate is represented by her Personal 
Representative, Douglas P. Simpson, as Intervener, died on January 10, 
1980. (Decision of S. Ct., R. 583) 
2. Milton J. Hiltsley, whose estate is represented by his 
personal representative, Ruth S. Hiltsley, died on August 26, 1981. 
(Decision of S. Ct., R. 583) 
3. Ihe Third District Court, Judge Bryant H. Croft, rendered 
its decision after trial between Plaintiff and Defendant, on March 29, 
1983. (R. 97-99) 
4. Defendant filed Notice of Appeal on April 11, 1983. 
(R.100) 
5. Intervener was appointed personal representative of the 
estate of Etta Wood on May 25, 1983 in the Third District Court, Probate # 
P83-416. (Motion to Intervene, S. Ct. file 19145) 
6. Intervener, not a party to the lawsuit, filed a Motion to 
Intervene in the proceedings on appeal before the Utah Supreme Court on 
August 30, 1983, which motion was denied. (S. Ct. file 19145) 
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7. On June 10, 1987, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
rendered its decision reversing the Judgment of the lower court and 
remanded the case back to the Third District Court for joinder of the 
estate of Etta Wood. (R. 583-585) 
8. Intervener was made a party plaintiff in this lawsuit by 
Order of the Third District Court, Judge J. Dennis Frederick, dated July 
20, 1987. (R. 587-588) 
9. Intervener's Complaint was filed in Third District Court 
on July 29, 1987. (R. 583-585) 
10. Defendant's Answer filed August 17, 1987 raised the 
defense of the statute of limitations. (R. 594-596) 
11. Intervener filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on August 
21, 1987 (R. 601-603) asserting as the basis for such motion, that 
Defendant was collaterally estopped from denying the facts found by Judge 
Croft. 
12. Defendant thereafter filed a Cross Motion for Summary 
Judgment on September 4, 1987 (R. 614-615) asserting as the basis for such 
cross motion, the statute of limitations. 
13. The motions were heard by the Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick on September 14, 1987, and on September 24, 1987 Judge Frederick 
signed an order denying Intervener's motion and granting Defendant's cross 
motion, and judgment was entered dismissing the catplaint filed by the 
Intervener. (R. 620-621) It is this Order and Judgment Dismissing 
Complaint in Intervention which is the subject of Intervener's appeal. 
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SDMMAKY OF ARGDMENTS 
1. The claims asserted against Defendant in the Intervener's 
Corplaint are barred by the statute of limitations because more than four 
years have elapsed between the time the heirs of Etta Wood knew of the 
alleged wrongful acts of her brother, Milton J. Hiltsley, and of the 
repudiation of any intention of the Defendant to hold the moneys in trust 
for the Etta Wood estate. 
2. The statute of limitations is not tolled by Title 78-12-40, 
LLC.A. 1953, as amended, because Intervener was not a party to the first 
action filed by Plaintiff, was not and is not Plaintiff's representative, 
did not seek any relief in the first action, and bears no conmunity of 
interest or privity of estate with the Plaintiff. Intervener's claims are 
new and substantively different than those asserted by Plaintiff in the 
first action. 
3. As part of Intervener's appeal, he seeks to have this Court 
reverse the order denying his motion for summary judgment and to grant the 
same. Such an order denying a motion for summary judgment is not an 
appealable order. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1. INIERVENOR'S CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANT ARE BARRED BY THE 
STATUTE OF LIMnATIONS. 
The claim asserted against the Defendant by the Intervener in his 
Corrplaint in Intervention is that Defendant holds property which belongs to 
Intervener as personal representative of the estate of Etta Wood 
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(paragraphs 7 and 8 of Oamplaint, R. 592) and that such property is held by 
Defendant as a trustee for Etta Wood's estate (paragraph (3) of prayer for 
relief in Complaint. (R. 593) 
Although the Complaint never uses the words "constructive trust", it 
is clear that such is the principle of law on which Intervenor seeks to 
hold Defendant as a trustee for the Wood estate. (Appellant's Brief, Point 
II, p. 15-19) 
The statute of limitations applicable to a constructive trust is 
Title 75-12-25, which is four years, and which begins to run from the time 
the beneficiary has notice of the trustee's repudiation of the trust. 
Wasden v. Coltharp, 631 P. 2d 849 (Utah 1981); Walker v. Walker, 17 Ut. 2d 
53, 404 P. 2d 253 (1965). 
Assuming that a constructive trust existed, as the lower court must 
have assumed for purposes of the Defendants cross motion for summary 
judgment, the evidence is unclear as to when, exactly, the heirs of Etta 
Wood first knew that the Reverend Hiltsley had repudiated his trust and had 
deposited the monies he allegedly held for the benefit of Etta Wood, or her 
estate, into savings accounts or certificates in his name and the 
Defendant's, as joint tenants. It is clear, however, that the heirs became 
aware of such a possibility at the time of the lcwer court's decision, 
entered by Judge Croft, on the 29th day of March, 1983, awarding the estate 
of Etta Wood in excess of $40,000.00 based upon the court's finding that a 
constructive trust existed. 
Under the most favorable set of facts which Intervenor could argue, 
he knew (which means the heirs knew) at the time of his appointment as 
personal representative, on May 25, 1983, of the alleged facts giving rise 
to his present lawsuit and of the alleged wrong of Milton J. Hiltsley in 
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depositing monies received from Etta Wood in the bank accounts and 
certificates of deposit in question. In addition, by May 25, 1983, Etta 
Wood's heirs were aware of Defendant's claim to such monies and of her 
repudiation of any alleged obligation she mic£it have to hold such monies in 
trust for the estate of Etta Wood, because Defendant had filed her Notice 
of Appeal on April 11, 1983. (R. 100-101) 
From May 25, 1983 until Intervener filed his complaint in the Third 
District Court on July 29, 1987, a period of more than 4 years had elapsed. 
Intervener has not denied, in either his Response to Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment in the lewer court (R. 616-618) or in his Brief before 
this Court, that the heirs were aware of the alleged facts which are the 
basis of Intervener's coitplaint by May 25, 1983. Intervener's position is 
that he is not barred by the statute of limitations because of the 
provisions of Title 78-12-40, U.C.A. 1953, as amended. 
Point 2. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS NOT TOLLED BY TTTTE 78-12-40. 
Title 78-12-40, U.C.A. 1953, as amended provides as follows: 
Effect of failure of action not on merits. 
If any action is commenced within due time and a 
judgment thereon for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the 
plaintiff fails in such action or upon a cause of action 
otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited either 
by law or contract for exxnmencing the same shall have 
expired, the plaintiff, or if he dies and the cause of action 
survives, his representatives, may commence a new action 
within one year after the reversal or failure. 
The facts of Intervener's case fail to meet the test of Title 78-12-
40 in several respects: 
(1) The statute clearly says "the plaintiff, or if he dies... his 
representatives". The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Thomas v. 
Braffet's Heirs, 6 Utah 2d 57, 305 P.2d 507 (1956) interpreted the meaning 
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of the word "plaintiff" in the statute to include "any party to the 
original lawsuit who had affirmatively sought relief therein". Intervener 
was not a party plaintiff or defendant in the original lawsuit tried before 
Judge Croft. He certainly was not Plaintiff's representative. 
(2) Intervenor sought no relief in the original lawsuit. Intervenor 
asks this Court, on page 10 of his Brief, to extend the meaning of the word 
"plaintiff" in Title 78-12-40 to include not only a party who seeks 
affirmative relief "in this and the prior action", but to any party who 
affirmatively seeks relief in this or in the prior action". (emphasis 
added) 
He also asks this Court to equate the seeking of relief in the prior 
action to Intervener's seeking "the relief granted her by Judge Croft prior 
to the time the statute of limitations had run." (See p. 10 of 
Intervener's Brief) 
Such an extension of the statutory language would be entirely at 
odds with the holding of the Utah Supreme Court in the Thomas, supra, case 
and in IXinn v. Kelly, 675 P.2d 571 (Utah 1983) discussed below. 
(3) Intervenor bears no identity with, or legal relationship to, 
the Plaintiff. Each represents wholly different parties vfaose claims are 
substantively different and inccirpatible. Whereas Plaintiff made claims in 
her suit against Defendant of fraud, undue influence, alienation of 
affections, and diversion of the subject savings accounts and certificates 
in which Plaintiff claimed an interest in her own right, (Decision of S. 
Ct., R. 583), Intervenor claims that Milton J. Hiltsley, whose estate is a 
plaintiff (and third party defendant herein) had a fiduciary relationship 
with his sister, Etta Wood, which was breached, and that Milton J. Hiltsley 
and/or Defendant held such savings accounts and certificates as trustees 
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for the benefit of Etta Wood's estate. (Conplaint in Intervention, R. 589-
593) 
Decisions throughout the country seem to agree that a person who 
claims an independent cause of action cannot intervene in the original 
action after the statute of limitations has run. 51 Am Jur 2d, Limitation 
of Actions, § 263; 8 AIR 2d p. 92, § 43. Or, said in another way, "...where 
no asmmunity of interest or privity of estate exists between the intervenor 
and another party or parties to the original action, the connraencernent of 
the action before the statute of limitations has run does not inure to the 
benefit of a person who intervenes after the time when an action would be 
barred." 51 Am Jur 2d, Limitation of Actions, § 262. See also 8 ALR 2d p. 
90, § 42. 
The saving provisions of Title 78-12-40 are of no help to Intervener 
either. As stated in 51 Am Jur 2d, Limitations of Actions, § 318, at page 
820: 
As a general rule a statute permitting 
commencement of a new action within a specified time 
after failure of a prior action other than on the 
merits is not applicable where the parties in the new 
action are not the same as the ones in the prior 
action. Thus, where an enabling act permits a 
subsequent action after the limitation period where 
the first suit has failed, the second suit must be 
substantially the same cause of action and must be 
prosecuted by the same plaintiff or his legal 
representatives against all the defendants vrtio were 
necessary parties to the first suit or their legal 
representatives. And a saving statute does not apply 
when the new action is brought against a different 
defendant than was the first one, or by a different 
plaintiff. 
In the case of Dunn v. Kellv. 675 P. 2d 571 (Utah 1983) the first 
plaintiff in a wrongful death action was the guardian-ad-litem for a minor 
who claimed to be the natural son of the decedent. His action was 
dismissed when it was established that the said minor was not the child of 
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the decedent and not, therefore, entitled to recover under the action. The 
second coirplaint, filed by the statutory heirs of the decedent, was filed 
after the statute of limitations for actions in wrongful death had run. 
The trial court dismissed the second coirplaint on the grounds that the 
Statute of Limitation had run, and the decision was appealed. In it's 
opinion affirming the dismissal by the trial court on the basis of the 
statute of limitations, Justice Durham, writing for a unanimous court, in 
reference to Title 78-12-40, stated the following: 
There is no basis in the statute for the construction 
the appellants urge upon us. The statute clearly says "the 
plaintiff or if he dies... his representatives." in Thomas v 
Braffet's Heirs. 6 Utah 2d 57, 305 P.2d 507 (1956), this 
Court construed the term "plaintiff" to include any party to 
the original lawsuit who had affirmatively sought relief 
therein, thus giving a deferriant-cxxmterclaimant the benefit 
of its provisions. The Court said: 
We think, however, that the purpose behind the 
statute is plain and that the legislature intended 
that anyone who had a cause in litigation which 
was dismissed for some reason "otherwise than upon 
the merits" should have a reasonable time, which it 
set as one year, to reassert and attempt to 
establish his rights in court.... We think that 
the word "plaintiff" as used in this section was 
meant to include not only the party who brings the 
action, but any party \<dio affirmatively seeks 
relief .. .in this and the prior action. 
Id. at 62, 305 P. 2d at 510-11 (citations omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
The appellants concede they sought no relief and in fact 
were not parties to the prior action. They also concede they 
have no legal relationship to the original plaintiff,.... 
Absent any identity or legal relationship between these 
appellants and the plaintiff in the first suit, it is 
impossible for this Court to apply § 78-12-40 to them. They 
simply had no interest in the first suit and are now barred 
from litigating their interest in this case because it is not 
timely asserted. 
As in the case now before the Court, the second plaintiffs in the 
Dunn v. Kelly, supra, case represented that they had attempted to intervene 
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prior to the running of the statute of limitations. The court, in response 
to such assertion, stated: 
These representations are not matters of record in this case 
and, even if true, merely establish that the appellants had an 
opportunity to assert their claim in a timely fashion, but lost it 
through their failure to appeal from the denial of their motion to 
amend. We can do nothing to rectify that loss in this case without 
ignoring the clear language and intent of our statute. (Emphasis 
added) 
None of the cases cited by Intervener in his Brief, Point 1, is 
factually similar to the case before this Court, except the case of IXmn v. 
Kelly, supra. Intervenor claims that the Dunn case is distinguishable from 
the case at hand but he offers nothing to support his conclusion. 
Defendant asserts that the case of IXinn v. Kelly, supra, is 
determinative of the issue before this Court. The only difference in the 
two cases is that in this case, the second plaintiff (Etta Wood estate) had 
been erroneously awarded judgment in the original action. 
The court in Houser v. Smith. 19 Ut. 150, 56 P. 683 (1889) declared 
that type of judgment to be "wrongfully and illegally decreed" and 
"absolutely void". The court in Tanner v. Provo Reservoir Co., 99 Ut. 158, 
103 P. 2d 134 (1940) declared that type of judgment to be a decree which 
could not alter the rights and duties of the non party or "bind it in any 
way whatever". And the court in R.M.S. Corp. v. Baldwin, 576 P.2d 881 
(Utah 1978) said that such a judgment in favor of a non party could not be 
rendered. 
If the judgment granted by Judge Croft in the first action was 
absolutely void, wrongful and illegal, and did not alter the rights or 
duties of the Estate of Etta Wood, as the cases and authorities hold, then 
the "right" to maintain this action should not be expanded or protected to 
defeat the statute of limitations. 
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Intervenor could have filed his lawsuit in a separate action against 
Defendant within the time allowed by the statute of limitations, and that 
action could have been stayed pending the decision of the Supreme Court in 
the earlier action. Instead Intervenor gambled that the decision of the 
Supreme Court would be favorable, and lost. 
Point 3. THE DENIAL BY THE TRIAL COURT OF INTERVENOR'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NOT A FINAL ORDER FROM WHICH AN APPEAL MAY BE TAKEN. 
Intervener's motion for summary judgment (R601-603) was denied by 
the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick in his order dated September 24, 1987 (R-
620-621). 
Without arguing the merits of such denial, it is clear that the 
procedural law in Utah does not permit an appeal from the denial of a 
motion for summary judgment, such an order not being a final order or 
judgment. Dennison v. Crown Toyota Motors, Inc., 571 P 2d 1359, 1360 (Utah 
1977); Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, Rule 3 (a). 
For the above reason, Defendant does not respond further to Points 
II and III set out in Intervener's Brief. 
CX3NCLUSI0N 
The order and judgment of the lower court dismissing Intervener's 
conplaint should be affirmed. 
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Dated this 19th day of February, 1988. 
RCMNEY & CONDIE 
DeLyle H.Ttondie 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that true copies of the foregoing Respondent's 
Brief were served upon Intervener by hand delivering four (4) copies of the 
same this 19th day of February, 1988, to his attorney, Dwight L. King, 
Esq., Dwight L. King & Associates, P.C., Suite 205 Sentinel Bldg., 2121 
South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
DeLyle H. Coi 
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